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Abstract 
The present paper summarises a series of studies aimed at 
identifying the individual and organisational factors that 
contribute to aviation maintenance errors, violations, and 
reporting behaviour.  The first study in the series concentrated 
on errors. The second study was essentially a replication of 
the first study with some minor extensions to the predictor set 
and refinements to the criterion variable. The third study 
introduced an additional criterion variable called violations 
and a variable that we labeled willingness to commit 
violations. The implications of our findings are discussed in 
the context of aviation maintenance and high risk industries in 
general.  
Introduction 
Whenever the probable causes of aircraft accident are 
listed, maintenance-associated deficiencies invariably 
hold a prominent place. Rankin (1997), in examining 
the experience of the Boeing organisation, reported that 
improper maintenance contributed to 15% of 
commercial jet accidents.  Based on Boeing’s 
experience, Marx (1998) calculated that in the USA 
alone the number of commercial aircraft dispatched 
each year with a maintenance error was roughly 48,800.  
This rather alarming figure is tempered when the 
number of maintenance actions performed each day is 
taken into consideration; nevertheless, it is evident that 
maintenance is having an impact on flight not merely in 
terms of safety but also in operational costs. 
Despite this, until recently, empirical research into 
the nature of maintenance incidents and their related 
human factors has been negligible. The literature tends 
to be dominated by descriptive models based on 
qualitative data, usually originating from accident 
reports. The present research programme represents a 
concerted effort to make up for our relative lack of 
knowledge concerning the causes of maintenance 
incidents. We will demonstrate that the area does lend 
itself to quantitative study and that the findings provide 
much-needed empirical backup for the popular models 
of accident causation. 
 
 
Study 1  
The first study (Fogarty, Saunders, & Collyer, 1999) 
was designed to explore the role of individual and 
organizational variables in maintenance performance. 
Specifically, the objectives of the study were to: a) 
examine a number of organisational, job and individual 
factors that were considered likely to impact on 
maintenance performance; b) explore the relations 
among these variables; and c) develop a model for 
predicting self-reported maintenance errors.  
Following two phases of qualitative research 
incorporating analysis of an incident database and two 
series of focus group interviews, a survey methodology 
was used to develop a structural model linking predictor 
variables with self-reported errors. Because this study 
served as the platform for the three that followed, it will 
be described in some detail. The scales themselves were 
not always the same across the different studies, but the 
underlying constructs were essentially the same. 
 
Participants 
The survey was administered to Australian Army 
Aviation personnel working on aircraft maintenance. A 
total of 448 individuals responded, 95% of whom were 
male. In terms of work specialities, 11% were trainees, 
41% tradespersons, 22% supervisors, 11% independent 
inspectors, and 15% in other categories. Median time 
spent in maintenance work was approximately five 
years. 
 
Materials 
A questionnaire was developed to measure a range of 
variables considered to be related to maintenance 
performance. The variables comprising the 
questionnaire, which we called the Maintenance 
Environment Survey Scale (MES), are described below. 
• Rewards, Recognition. This variable assesses the 
extent to which people feel that they are rewarded and 
recognised for doing good work. Example: In this job, 
people are rewarded according to performance. 
• Physical Conditions. Measures the quality of the 
actual physical surrounds of the workplace. Example: 
The physical conditions make working here unpleasant. 
 
• Attitude To Safety. Assesses the perception that the 
organisation has a strong concern for safety issues. 
Example: This unit regards safety as a major factor in 
achieving its goals. 
• Efficiency. There are many aspects to efficiency; 
here we looked at the tendency of the work units to 
emphasise improvement in work practices. Example: In 
my unit, management actively supports our efforts to 
improve. 
• Training. The items in this scale covered a number 
of different aspects of training, including adequacy of 
training for the job, encouragement to undertake further 
training, and opportunities for on-the-job training. 
Example: My training and experience has prepared me 
well for the duties of my current job. 
• Documentation/Procedures. Poor documentation is 
often cited as a reason for maintenance errors. 
Documentation refers to manuals, not log books or the 
like. Example: Maintenance procedures are accurately 
described in our technical manuals. 
• Family Pressures. Maintenance personnel in the 
armed forces are often required to be absent from home. 
It was expected that the absences would result in 
personal strain, which may in turn affect work 
performance. Example: The demands of my work 
interfere with my home and family life. 
• Stress. The questions comprising this scale tended 
to tap actual feelings and consequences of stress, rather 
than background factors that might be causing the 
stress. Example: Workload pressures have at times 
affected the quality of my work. 
• Fatigue/Sleep. Given the difficulty of adequately 
assessing fatigue in a self-report measure, the questions 
in this scale focussed on the quality of sleep. Example: 
My overall sleep quality is extremely poor. 
• General Health. The General Health Questionnaire 
(GHQ: Goldberg and Williams, 1988), an instrument 
already widely used in the armed services, was included 
as part of the survey of maintenance personnel. The 
GHQ explores four aspects of psychological health: 
somatic symptoms (e.g., Have you been getting any 
pains in your head?); anxiety and insomnia (e.g., Have 
you found everything getting on top of you?); social 
dysfunction (e.g., Have you felt that you are playing a 
useful part of things?); and severe depression (e.g., 
Have you felt that life isn't worth living?). An 
abbreviated, 12-item version of the GHQ was used 
here. 
• Job Satisfaction. The questions in MES targetted 
the actual feeling of satisfaction, rather than why they 
might or might not feel this way. Example: I like 
maintenance work. 
• Responsibility. When employees enjoy a sense of 
responsibility for their work, it is reasonable to expect 
that they will exercise more care and diligence. 
Example: I feel I have little input into the decision-
making at work. (Reverse-scored item). 
• Supervision. The quality of work supervision was 
brought forward as a problem in a number of our 
interviews with management in the early stages of this 
project. Example: My immediate supervisor really 
understands the maintenance task. 
• Support from Coworkers. It is difficult to operate 
effectively in a work environment unless there is a 
feeling of support from one's colleagues. In the present 
instance, questions focussed on expectations that - if 
needed - workers would receive assistance from 
coworkers. Example: Most of my workmates can be 
relied upon to do what they say they will do.  
• Feedback. Many maintenance personnel are in the 
early stages of their careers and still learning the trade. 
Their effectiveness is likely to be shaped by the amount 
and quality of feedback they receive. Example: The 
quality of our work is rated or evaluated frequently. 
• Organisational Commitment. Again, interviews 
with management highlighted concerns with the level of 
organisational commitment in today's maintenance 
workforce. Such concerns were fuelled by the 
outsourcing of maintenance tasks, the mixing of 
civilians and service personnel in the same workplace, 
and a possible shift in values among service personnel. 
Example:  I am proud to tell others that I am part of 
this unit. 
• Turnover Intentions. One item asked about the job 
intentions of staff, whether they intended to keep 
working in the maintenance industry, leave the industry, 
or whether they were uncertain. High turnover leads to 
manpower shortages and greater pressure on existing 
staff to keep up with the workload. 
• Errors. MES included four questions that asked the 
respondents to indicate whether they made maintenance 
errors on the job. These included errors that they 
detected themselves and those picked up by their 
supervisors. 
All items employed a five-point (1-5) Likert scale 
format where 1 indicated strong agreement and 5 strong 
disagreement.  
 
Results  
To establish whether the questionnaire succeeded in 
measuring the aspects it set out to measure, the items 
were subjected to factor analysis. As a result of these 
analyses, some items were discarded. The remaining 
items were used to form scales that in general 
conformed to those intended to be captured by MES. 
All scales had satisfactory reliability estimates (α > 
.70). Structural equation modelling (SEM), using 
version 4.01 of Arbuckle's (1999) AMOS program, was 
then employed to test models of the relations among the 
MES variables. A two-step approach was followed 
 
wherein a second order measurement model was 
derived from the composite variables followed by 
testing of a structural model linking the input and 
output variables. Without going into details of various 
competing models that were tested, a simplified version 
of the final model is shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Effect of workplace climate on morale, 
psychological health, and errors (indicator variables not 
shown). 
 
Fit statistics for this model were acceptable  (χ2, 74  = 
152.07 .14, p < .01; TLI = .93; RMSEA = .04).  
 
Discussion 
Apart from the demonstration of strong links among the 
latent constructs and also the robust R-Square values, 
the main feature of this model was the lack of a direct 
pathway between climate and errors. Further discussion 
is deferred until the presentation of Study 2, which was 
basically a replication of Study 1.  
 
Study 2 
The Fogarty et al. (1999) study provided strong 
empirical support for a model that is implicit in the 
theories of Reason (1990, 1997) and embedded in a 
number of error taxonomies (e.g., HFACS: Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 1997). As such, the study represents an 
important contribution to the literature on human error. 
However, one limitation of the study by Fogarty and 
colleagues was the small number of items (4) used to 
construct the error scale. To improve this aspect of the 
design and to cross-validate the model obtained in 
Study 1, a revised version of MES was administered to 
a fresh sample of maintenance engineers (Fogarty, 
Saunders, & Collyer, 2001).  
 
Participants 
A total of 106 maintenance engineers (mostly males) 
working at one of  two main helicopter repair bases for 
the Australian Army responded to the survey, 
representing a response rate of over 90%. Of the 106 
respondents, 48% were tradespersons and 52% trainees. 
The average age of the respondents was 28.5 years and 
most (84%) had been working as a maintenance 
engineer for at least one year but less than four years. 
 
Materials 
A revised version of the Maintenance Environment 
Survey (MES), was used. The contents of the first 
version of MES (see Study 1) can be taken as a good 
guide to the scales included in Study 2. 
 
Results 
All scales had satisfactory reliability estimates (α > 
.70). Inspection of Pearson Product Moment correlation 
coefficients indicated that four of the organisational 
variables were related to the Error scale. The relevant 
variables were: Safety (r = -.27), Communication (r = -
.30) Co-Worker Support (r = -.33), and Documentation  
(r = -.21). As expected, these correlations were all 
negative, indicating that low scores on these 
organisational variables were associated with high error 
rates. All three variables defining the Individual factor 
were correlated with Errors: Stress (r = .38), Fatigue (r 
= .25), GHQ (r = .28). As expected, these correlations 
were positive, indicating that high levels of stress, 
fatigue, and health problems were associated with high 
error rates. An abbreviated form of the full structural 
model is shown in Figure 2.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Replication of model showing effect of 
workplace climate on morale, health, and errors. 
 
The salient points of the model were as follows: 
• Fit statistics were again acceptable, thus cross-
validating the model reported in Study 1.  
• The link between Morale and Errors was not 
significant.  
• The drop in R-Square value for errors was probably 
due to the fact that this sample of maintenance 
engineers was more restricted, consisting mostly of 
newer recruits who had only recently completed basic 
theoretical training.   
 
Discussion 
Taken together, the findings from these two studies 
support the claims of other researchers who point to the 
role that social and organizational factors can have on 
 
human error (e.g., Reason, 1990). As these researchers 
assert, many errors result from interacting causes 
involving physical, cognitive, social, and organizational 
factors. To understand this interaction requires a model 
of how the components of the system work together to 
influence outcomes. We have provided such a model. 
 
Study 3 
The third study in the series introduced two new 
variables: willingness to violate and actual violations. 
The first of these variables was suggested by Ajzen’s 
(1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour, a theory that 
attempts to explain the link between attitudes, 
intentions, and actual behaviour by examining the 
contribution of norms and the individual’s perceptions 
of his or her control over behavioural options. The 
introduction of violations as a variable of interest in this 
research programme was in response to claims in the 
literature that violations are often immediate 
predecessors to errors (Reason, 1990; Lawton, 1998; 
Flin et al., 2000). Violations are also more amenable to 
change than errors which, by definition, are not 
intentional. It was hypothesized that willingness to 
violate would be influenced by safety climate and that 
willingess, in turn, would exert a major influence on 
actual violation behaviour. Violations were also 
expected to contribute to errors. 
 
Method 
The methodology was identical to that used in the first 
two studies. Some changes were made to the 
measurement scales for the Safety Climate construct. 
Otherwise, apart from the addition of the new variables, 
the model remained essentially unchanged.  
 
Participants 
A total of 307 maintenance engineers from the 
Australian Defence Force (105 Army, 86 from Navy, 
and 116 from the Air Force) responded to a revised 
Maintenance Environment Survey admininistered in 
conjunction with an in-house survey developed by the 
Directorate of Flying Safety of the Australian Defence 
Force.  The combination of two surveys  (209 items in 
total) resulted in a total testing time somewhere 
between 30-45 minutes.  
 
Results 
As was the case in the first two studies, exploratory 
factor analysis was used to establish the factor structure 
of the questionnaire and to confirm that hypothesized 
constructs were represented in the data.  There were no 
problems in this regard and a simplified representation 
of the full structural equation model is shown in Figure 
3. Fit statistics for this model were acceptable (e.g., CFI 
= .94; RMSEA = .05). 
 
Figure 3. Model showing the precursors to errors and 
violations in aviation maintenance. 
 
Discussion 
Three features of the model shown in Figure 3 are 
worthy of comment. Firstly, violations appear to occur 
whether or not the individuals concerned are actually 
willing to commit these violations. Focus group 
interviews with respondents confirm this impression: 
they see themselves as often forced to work outside 
strict procedural guidelines because of resource 
shortages, work pressures, and the like. Interestingly, 
the interviews reveal that they do not see themselves as 
working unsafely when using these shortcuts, relying on 
their knowledge and skill level to achieve a safe 
outcome using non-standard procedures. McDonald et 
al. (2000) made a similar observation when noting that 
the impact of the organisation safety system is mediated 
by a professional sub-culture in which maintenance 
engineers see their role as not necessarily blindly 
following procedures but exercising their knowledge, 
skills, and professional values to enable them to 
maintain the overall safety of the aircraft. 
A second feature of this model is the significant 
link between violations and errors, suggesting that – 
despite the above belief – violations are often a 
precursor to errors. The third feature is the further 
confirmation that the link between safety climate and 
errors is entirely indirect. This is now a well-replicated 
finding.  
The finding that errors and violations have 
different origins is something that needs to be conveyed 
to practitioners in the safety industry. Too often these 
qualitatively different safety outcome variables are 
linked together as though they are indistinguishable. 
Indeed, some definitions of error include violations as a 
type of error.  We reject that point of view entirely. 
Although violations are less under the control of the 
individual than we supposed at the outset of this 
research programme, they are nevertheless directly 
influenced by safety climate. Errors are also influenced 
by safety climate but only in an indirect way. Attempts 
 
to reduce error must therefore aim at both individual 
and organisational levels. 
Conclusions 
The safety literature tends to be dominated by 
discussions of error taxonomies and descriptive models 
of accident causation, such as that provided by Reason 
(1990). We see these contributions as valuable but we 
also believe that they must be supported by empirical 
research. Structural equation modeling is a technique 
that can be used to test nomological networks 
embedded in popular descriptions of accident causation. 
Through these three studies, we have developed, tested, 
and cross-validated a model that explains how errors 
can occur in safety-conscious industries. We have also 
shown how they are linked with violations. The basic 
model that we have presented is capable of elaboration 
and further testing. In ongoing research, we are seeking 
to extend the model to include incident reporting, 
another key variable in the quest to achieve safer and 
more productive working environments.  
Acknowledgments 
We wish to acknowledge the contribution of 
postgraduate students who have assisted with this 
research, notably Mr Bob Saunders. We also 
acknowledge the cooperation of the Australian Defence 
Force, especially Lt Col Rob Collyer and Lt Col Peter 
Murphy from Army Aviation, Squadron Leader Mark 
French and Warrant Officer Jeff Ballard from the 
Directorate of Flying Safety, and the many maintenance 
personnel who have willingly given their time to the 
project. 
References 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The Theory of Planned Behaviour, 
Organisational Behaviour and Human Decision 
Processes,  50, 179-211. 
Arbuckle, J.L. (1999). Amos users’ guide: Version 4.0. 
Chicago, IL: Smallwaters Corporation. 
Flin, R., Mearns, K., O’Connor, P., & Bryden, R. 
(2000). Measuring safety climate: Identifying the 
common features. Safety Science, 34, 177-192.  
Fogarty, G.J., Saunders, R., & Collyer, R. (1999). 
Developing a model to predict aircraft maintenance 
performance. Paper presented at the Tenth 
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. 
Columbus, Ohio.  
Fogarty, G. J., Saunders, R., & Collyer, R. (2001). The 
role of individual and organisational factors in 
aviation maintenance. Paper presented at the 
Eleventh International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology, Colombus Ohio. 
Lawton, R. (1998). Not working to rule: Understanding 
procedural violations at work. Safety Science, 28(2), 
77-95. 
Marx, D.A.  (1998). Learning from our mistakes:  
Review of maintenance error investigation and 
analysis systems.  Report prepared for FAA.  
Galaxy Scientific Corporation.  
McDonald, N., Corrigan, S., Daly, C., & Cromie, S. 
(2000). Safety management systems and safety 
culture in aircraft maintenance organisations. Safety 
Science 34, 151-176. 
Rankin, W.L.  (1997). Maintenance error decision aid:  
Progress report.  Proceedings of eleventh meeting on 
human factors issues in aviation maintenance and 
inspection:  FAA. 
Reason, J.T.  (1990).  A framework for classifying 
errors.  In J. Rasmussen, K. Duncan & J. Leplat 
(Eds.),  New Technology and Human Error.  
London:  John Wiley. 
Reason, J.T. (1997). Managing the risks of 
organizational accidents. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
Shappell, S.A., & Wiegmann, D.A.  (1997). A human 
error approach to accident investigation:  The 
taxonomy of unsafe operations.  International 
Journal of Aviation Psychology, 7 (4), 269-291. 
 
 
